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 ABSTRACT
 "Public entrepreneurship" is the process of introducing
 innovation--the generation, translation, and implementation of new
 ideas-into the public sector. The research described here focuses on
 "policy entrepreneurs." These are public entrepreneurs who, from
 outside the formal positions of government, introduce, translate, and
 help implement new ideas into public practice.
 INTRODUCTION
 Public policymaking, according to Kingdon, can be con-
 ceptualized as a set of processes: (1) setting the agenda;
 (2) specifying alternatives for the agenda; (3) an authoritative
 choosing among the alternatives, expressed through legislative
 enactment or executive decision; and (4) implementing the
 decision or the law (1984, 3). Polsby adds an additional process
 prior to agenda setting--"initiation"--and describes it as "the
 politics of inventing, winnowing, and finding and gaining
 adherents for policy alternatives before they are made a part of
 a 'program"' (1984, 3).
 Although focusing their research attention on different
 phases, both scholars identify a stratum of actors essential to
 the process of policymaking. These actors are public entre-
 preneurs, long recognized as important contributors to the
 policy process (Eyestone 1978; Kingdon 1984; Polsby 1984;
 Price 1971; Walker 1974). In an analysis of twenty-three policy-
 formulation case studies, for example, Kingdon reported that
 entrepreneurs were coded as "very or somewhat important in
 15, and unimportant in only 3" (1984, 189). Although no single
 person received full credit for the formulation of policy, most
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 observers viewed the public entrepreneurs as "central figures
 in the drama" (p. 189).
 Polsby sees the public entrepreneurs as individuals "who
 specialize in identifying problems and finding solutions" (1984,
 171). Public entrepreneurs provide the ideas and issues, and
 the technical support for solutions. In order to move their
 ideas and preferred solutions from "incubation" to enactment,
 however, they need allies; they need politicians. As a conse-
 quence, they form a "symbiotic relationship" with politicians
 who, because of their periodic appeals to electorates, have "to
 identify and to be identified with issues" (p. 171). In entering
 this exchange relationship with political leaders, public entre-
 preneurs get help to enact policies of which they approve. In
 turn, they "yield up public credit, which politicians need in
 order to survive in their election-dependent world" (p. 172).
 In a somewhat different light, Kingdon views public
 entrepreneurs as individuals "willing to invest their resources
 in return for future policies they favor" (1984, 214). Although
 public entrepreneurs highlight problems, push for one kind of
 problem definition over another, and develop proposals from
 their ideas, their function is that of coupler in a very complex
 policy process. Using a revised version of Cohen, March, and
 Olsen's (1972) garbage-can model of organizational choice,
 Kingdon conceives of three separate streams as part of the
 agenda-setting and alternative-specification process: problems,
 policies, and politics. And joining together the three streams
 "depends heavily on the appearance of the right entrepreneur
 at the right time" (1984, 214).
 Despite the varied interpretations of public entrepreneurs'
 functions, descriptions of what they actually do through the
 policy process has been presented only in rather general terms.
 Thus, public entrepreneurs
 * advocate new ideas and develop proposals (Kingdon 1984;
 Polsby 1984; Walker 1981);
 * define and reframe problems (Cobb and Elder 1983;
 Polsby 1984; Kingdon 1984);
 * specify policy alternatives (Cobb and Elder 1983; Kingdon
 1984; Walker 1981);
 * broker the ideas among the many policy actors (Cobb and
 Elder 1983; Eyestone 1978);
 * mobilize public opinion (Kingdon 1984; Cobb and Elder
 1981); and
 * help set the decisionmaking agenda (Kingdon 1984;
 Walker 1981).
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 The goal in this paper is to build on this literature in
 order to develop a more elaborate description of policy entre-
 preneurs' activities. What specifically do policy entrepreneurs
 do and how do they do it? As central figures in the policy pro-
 cess, what are the scope and depth of their activities in that
 process? Do they work alone or with others? What strategies
 and tactics do they employ? Is there a pattern in their activities
 that is associated with policy acceptance and implementation?
 These questions are important to address for several
 reasons. Not only are entrepreneurs acknowledged to have a
 function as problem framers, alternative specifiers, and
 couplers in the policy process, but they also have an even
 broader function for society. As the father of modern entre-
 preneurial thought, Joseph Schumpeter, argues, the function of
 entrepreneurs is innovation (1939, 102).
 As an economist, Schumpeter defined innovation as the
 novel recombination of preexisting factors of production or a
 change in the production function, which "describes the way in
 which quantity of product varies if quantities of factors vary"
 (p. 87). Instead of varying the quantities of factors, "we vary
 the form of the function, we have innovation" (p. 87). In other
 words, innovation is the "setting up of a new production func-
 tion" (p. 87). What this means is that innovation combines
 factors in a new way or carries out new combinations of things
 (p. 88).
 This innovative function of the entrepreneur provides a
 learning and adaptive capacity for the policy system, indeed,
 for societies as a whole (Merritt and Merritt 1985; Walker
 1981). Through their willingness to take risks, entrepreneurs
 can help break the constraints under which public manage-
 ment operates by creating and molding agile, flexible organi-
 zations to meet the challenge of change (Cohen 1988). They can
 teach people to look upon social, technological, economic, and
 demographic shifts as opportunities and to develop public
 organizations that are entrepreneurial and innovative in their
 responses to problems. Building entrepreneurial management
 into existing public organizations, writes Drucker may be "the
 foremost political task of this generation" (1985, 187). "In fact,
 the task of innovating has become an integral part of the
 bureaucratic mandate" (Downs 1976, 15).
 Conceptual Foundations
 Before describing and analyzing a particular case, it is
 useful to lay the conceptual foundation for this work (Downs
 and Mohr 1976). "Public entrepreneurship" is a process of
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 introducing innovation to public sector practice. Innovation
 begins with a new idea that can be technological in nature
 (new technologies, products and services) or administrative
 (new procedures, policies and organizational forms) (Daft and
 Becker 1978). It represents a new combination of things that
 creates a disjuncture from standard operating procedures and
 the routine response of current systems. The newness of the
 idea is determined by its context, 'by the relevant unit of
 adoption" (Zaltman et al. 1973, 10). An idea is "new" if those
 involved in developing and implementing it consider it to be
 new, although the idea may have been earlier developed else-
 where. Asking whether an idea is new in a particular context
 is different from asking for the source of the idea in that
 context. While both are important, it is the former that
 becomes a defining characteristic of an innovative idea (Downs
 1976; Rogers 1983; Tomatzky et al. 1983; Van de Ven, Angle
 and Poole 1989; Zaltman, Duncan and Holbek 1973).
 The new idea is then translated or transformed into a
 more concrete reality, a prototype, which is a more developed
 and elaborate statement of the original idea. In the case of
 legislative innovation, the prototype is usually called a
 "proposal," which is ultimately designed into an even more
 formal statement, a 'bill." If enacted, the bill is transformed
 into a program and begins the implementation process.
 This evolution from innovative idea into proposal, bill,
 and program suggests that various functional stages or requis-
 ites are necessary to produce and sustain an innovation. Func-
 tional requisites, as a set of functions, goals, or forms, assume
 that one knows what a "developed" innovation looks like and
 then asks what was involved in getting it to that evolved state
 (Poole and Van de Ven 1989, 645-646). Although some varia-
 tion exists among the functional requisites or stages, four
 appear to be central:
 * creation--the stage when the innovative idea develops and
 emerges;
 * design-the stage when the innovative idea evolves into a
 more formal statement, proposal or bill and is enacted
 into law;
 * implementation--the stage when the innovative idea has
 been approved in theory and now expressed as a new
 program is tested in practice, and
 * institutionalization--the stage when the innovative idea
 becomes established practice to the point where it is no
 longer considered an innovative idea.'
 'The functional requisites represent a
 way to organize the many decisions
 in the policy process. Each function
 consists of a set of related behaviors
 and activities that have a logical
 connection to the function as a whole.
 While the functions or stages may
 represent oversimplifications of a very
 complex process, they still are con-
 ceptually useful analytical tools. For
 variation among the functional requis-
 ites, see Angle and Van de Ven (1989);
 Gross et al. (1971); Lambright and
 Teich (1979); Peltz (1984); Peltz and
 Munson (1982); Pressman and Wildav-
 sky (1974); Rogers (1983); Scioli (1986);
 Tornatzky et al. (1983); Zaltman et al.
 (1973).
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 Interpreting public entrepreneurship in this manner
 enables definition of "public entrepreneurs" generally as those
 individuals who participate in the first three stages: they
 develop a new idea, translate it into a more formal statement
 (such as a proposal, bill, or law), and then help to implement it
 into public practice as a new program.
 References to such entrepreneurs in the public-sector
 literature are varied and wide-ranging. There are examples of
 elected entrepreneurs as mayors (Dahl 1961), senators (Walker
 1974; 1977) and local prosecutors (Brintnall 1979). The activities
 of executive entrepreneurs who head public bureaus, such as J.
 Edgar Hoover and Robert Moses, have been well documented
 (Lewis 1984; 1988; Ramamurti 1986; Doig and Hargrove 1987),
 as well as those of entrepreneurs serving in nonelected and
 nonleadership positions, such as staff members of Senate
 committees (Price 1971) and administrators (Murphy 1979).
 Finally, there are examples of entrepreneurs operating in
 positions outside governmental systems who work to change
 public institutions (Kingdon 1984; Wilson 1980).
 Interpretation of this literature is difficult, however, for
 several reasons. The literature lacks a consensus on what a
 public entrepreneur is. Some authors emphasize risk taking as
 the defining criterion for public entrepreneurship (Cohen 1988;
 Kingdon 1984). Others note the introduction and development
 of innovative ideas (Polsby 1984; Walker 1981). Still others
 stress the importance of building bureaus that extend the
 power and influence of the entrepreneur (Lewis 1984; Doig
 and Hargrove 1987).
 The literature also describes public entrepreneurs in many
 different ways: as policy entrepreneurs, political entrepreneurs,
 program entrepreneurs, bureaucratic entrepreneurs, adminis-
 trative and executive entrepreneurs, and issue entrepreneurs.
 Rarely are these terms defined, much less distinguished from
 one another. Interpretation becomes difficult when researchers
 use the terms interchangeably without clarifying either
 meanings or whether and how the terms can be distinguished
 from one another (Doig and Hargrove 1987).
 This diversity, while it provides rich examples of
 individuals engaging in interesting activities in the public
 sector, does not facilitate systematic study of and comparison
 among public entrepreneurs. This lack of conceptual clarity
 makes distinctions between public entrepreneurs and other
 actors involved in the policy process problematic. For example,
 how does one differentiate entrepreneurs from policy
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 intellectuals (Wilson 1981) or policy champions (Angle and
 Van de Ven 1989) or others engaged in the policy process?
 In response to these conceptual problems in the literature
 and to the questions they raise, this study took a more limited
 view of public entrepreneurship. A "public entrepreneur" not
 only must have an innovative idea (which tends to be the
 domain of the policy intellectual), but also must design and
 translate that idea into a more formal, explicit statement.
 Working with those who have the formal power and resource
 control (typically referred to as policy champions), the public
 entrepreneur seeks acceptance of the innovative idea in law or
 executive fiat, and the eventual implementation of the innova-
 tive idea into practice. This distinguishes public entrepreneurs
 from others in the policy process because the former are
 involved in three phases of the policy process--creation, design,
 and implementation--as they promote their innovations
 (Roberts and King 1989a).
 Decisions are not made independently of a context; they
 are strongly influenced by the positions and relative power of
 decisionmakers in their relationships to one another (Etzioni
 1968; Pfeffer 1981). Therefore, a further analytic refinement of
 "public entrepreneurs" distinguishes between entrepreneurs on
 the basis of their locations throughout the policy system. The
 assumption is that entrepreneurial behavior is likely to be asso-
 ciated with the entrepreneur's base of power. Knowing that an
 individual's power is contingent upon resources (Pfeffer and
 Salancik 1978) and that that position is one element in the
 calculus of resources (Pfeffer 1981), we anticipated that a
 public entrepreneur's activities and behavioral pattern are
 likely related to position in the policy process.
 To anticipate future comparisons between types of
 entrepreneurs, especially in terms of their behavioral patterns,
 we separated public entrepreneurs into four different types
 (Roberts and King 1989a):
 * Political entrepreneurs, who hold elected leadership
 positions in government;
 * Executive entrepreneurs, who hold appointed leadership
 positions in government;
 * Bureaucratic entrepreneurs, who hold formal positions in
 government, although not leadership positions; and
 * Policy entrepreneurs, who work from outside the formal
 governmental system to introduce, translate, and imple-
 ment innovative ideas into public sector practice.
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 This study focuses on the activities and behavioral patterns of
 policy entrepreneurs as illuminated in a particular case.
 METHODOLOGY
 We approached the study of policy entrepreneurs with a
 longitudinal research design using multiple methods of data
 collection in multiple institutions, satisfying two out of three of
 Gormley's recommended criteria for policy analysis (Gormley
 1987, 158-159). (The limitations of this design are discussed in
 the final section.)
 Lacking a guiding substantive theory and a viable
 operational model at the outset of this study made a flexible
 methodological strategy imperative-one that could facilitate
 the discovery of useful conceptual units and appropriate
 operationalizations. Such an approach needed to be open-
 ended, aimed at uncovering and exploring critical linkages in
 the social system. In the absence of knowing a priori what these
 might be, more formalized methods, such as survey research,
 were inappropriate.2 Consequently, we chose to pursue
 "naturalistic inquiry" (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Schatzman and
 Strauss 1973) in order to develop "grounded theory" (Glaser
 and Strauss 1967) about policy entrepreneurs and policy
 entrepreneurship.
 Data Collection
 Data collection, beginning in the spring of 1983 and
 ending in the fall of 1988, included archival research, indepth
 interviews, and observations of key discussion groups, meet-
 ings, and education-related gatherings, such as legislative
 testimony or quasi-social functions. As the research became
 more focused on policy entrepreneurs, it included surveys and
 the administration of a battery of psychometric tests. All data
 were used for the analysis here, with the exception of those
 drawn from the psychometric tests (reported in King 1988) and
 an influence and impact survey which, if reported, would vio-
 late the confidentiality of the individual policy entrepreneurs.
 One hundred thirty-four interviews were conducted with
 the policy entrepreneurs, the governor and staff, the commis-
 sioner of education and staff, representatives from various
 executive departments, legislators and legislative staff
 members, lobbyists, educators representing teacher unions and
 various associations for principals, superintendents, parents,
 and school board members, and members of various grassroots
 organizations and interest groups. Exhibit 1 presents a matrix
 of the interviews conducted.
 2The latter presuppose a highly
 specified model from which to derive
 standardized instrumentation for
 systematic data gathering (Lieberson
 1985). This level of theoretical
 sophistication had yet to be attained
 in the early stages of this research.
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 Exhibit 1
 Role Matrix of the Interviewees
 Number of Number of
 Individuals Interviews
 Executive Agency Official 6 35
 Executive Agency Staff 11 18
 Policy Entrepreneur 6 25
 Interest-Group Member 15 20
 Interest-Group Lobbyist 5 5
 Legislator and Staff 14 18
 Informed Other 9 13
 Media 4 4
 Total 70 138
 Archival miaterial consisted of official state documents
 from the executive and legislative branches of government,
 interest group reports, newspaper articles and editorials,
 articles and position papers written by the policy entre-
 preneurs, speeches, doctoral dissertations, agenda, midnutes and
 handouts of group meetings, letters and memos, and studies
 from various research organizations.
 Direct observations occurred during social events, meet-
 ings, legislative hearings, press conferences, and presentations
 and speeches, in settings that ranged from retreat centers, to a
 university campus, to the state capital. The two researchers
 were observers in the Governor's Discussion Group meetings
 that were held on a monthly basis from August 1985 through
 December of 1986. The group, charged by the governor and
 convened by the conmmiissioner of education, was to develop a
 "visionary plan" for the state educational system. All groups in
 the innovation debate, with the exception of the legislators,
 participated in these meetings, giving us a natural setting in
 which to observe their interactions with one another.
 Background surveys were used to gather factual and
 demographic information (education, work experience, organi-
 zational affiliation, and policy expertise). Additionally, the
 policy entrepreneurs were asked to describe major life accomp-
 lishments. The purpose of the survey was to gather back-
 ground data in an efficient manner, thus conserving scarce
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 interview time to focus on questions best answered in an
 interview format.
 Sample
 Identifying the policy entrepreneurs for this study was an
 emergent process. The first author originally was involved in
 an analysis of innovative leadership at the local and state
 levels of govermnent (Roberts 1985). As events unfolded, a
 group of individuals-rather than the leader who was the
 initial focus of the study-surfaced as critical actors in debates
 on a new idea developing at the state level. We eventually
 identified these individuals as "policy entrepreneurs," using the
 definitional framework outlined above.
 The policy entrepreneurs who were the focus of this
 study, six in total, came from various positions outside govern-
 ment: a policy analyst; an educator/author; president of a non-
 profit organization; an academic; head of a lobby group; and
 an executive director of a public affairs think tank.3
 The policy entrepreneurs met the three criteria for public
 entrepreneurship. First, they introduced into a state educa-
 tional system a new idea called the "restructuring of education"
 or "educational choice." Second, in the ensuing four years, they
 not only helped translate this idea into legislation, but-third--
 participated in implementing programs that gave all primary
 and secondary school students in the state the option of cross-
 ing district boundaries and selecting their schools of choice.
 The ideas of the policy entrepreneurs were a departure
 from the solutions traditionally proposed by educational
 reformers. In interviews, members of the department of educa-
 tion and other major education groups in the state clearly
 characterized the policy entrepreneurs' ideas and recom-
 mended changes as "radical.'" In comparison, educational
 groups described their own orientation as toward "orderly
 change that occurs in sequential fashion, not bold change
 without study and research" (interest group member 1986;
 1987). The policy entrepreneurs, on the other hand, referred to
 their reform efforts as "educational restructuring." Their goal
 was not to "tinker around the edges," nor to take the incre-
 mental path advocated by the educational traditionalists. They
 sought to "transform" education rather than "improve" it (PE
 1985; 1986).
 Corroboration for this characterization of the policy
 entrepreneurs' ideas as innovative also came from a larger
 audience than the state community. In a subsequent review of
 'TMe number of policy entrepreneurs
 actively engaged in policy innovation
 varied over the five year life of this
 research project for two reasons. First,
 the level of participation by the policy
 entrepreneurs varied from year to
 year depending on their other pro-
 fessional and personal commitments.
 That is to say, not all six were active
 during the entire five-year period,
 although all did participate to some
 degree in the three functions of policy
 innovation. Secondly, as the data
 gathering and analysis progressed,
 we were able to make finer-grained
 distinctions between policy entre-
 preneurs and other key actors in the
 policy-innovation process. The
 sample, originally more inclusive,
 eventually eliminated policy (legis-
 lative) champions, policy adminis-
 trators, and "informed others" from
 the analysis. See King (1988) and
 Roberts and King (1989b) for a fur-
 ther explanation of this winnowing
 process.
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 the national reform efforts in education, the "consumer-driven
 strategy" of choice was described as a "radical change" in
 contrast to others undertaken throughout the country (Kirst
 1988).
 Data Analysis
 Data analysis for the research reported in this study was
 inductive rather than deductive because of the emergent, longi-
 tudinal design (Lincoln 1985, 145-46). Substantive codes were
 developed to categorize the various activities in which the
 policy entrepreneurs were engaged. Categories were progres-
 sively identified in an interactive process as the data were
 collected and analyzed, following the recommendations of
 Glaser and Strauss for the descriptive phase of theory-building
 research (1967, 36-39 and 101-15; see also Glaser 1978, 55-82).
 These categories ultimately were reviewed by the policy entre-
 preneurs and modifications were made where appropriate to
 include their observations and additional data.
 CASE SUMMARY
 Rather than calling for improvements in the current
 educational system, the policy entrepreneurs studied in this
 case espoused the innovative idea of "educational restruc-
 turing" or "educational redesign." This idea, developed from
 1980 to 1982, advocated a total revamping of the present
 educational system, beginning with a reexamination of its
 underlying assumptions or "givens" (PE 1985-88). "Restruc-
 turing" actually represented a cluster of ideas:
 * empower parents and students to choose a school district
 or program based on the unique learning needs of the
 student;
 * deregulate state mandates in order to reduce red tape,
 permit more local control over the schools, and to
 encourage creativity, innovation and change;
 * decentralize decisionmaking authority from district-level
 administrators to local school-site principals, teachers, and
 parents in order to empower those most intimately
 involved with student learning; and
 * increase accountability in the educational system by
 expanding outcome-based testing aimed at determining
 what students learned to ensure that quality education
 was being delivered.
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 The mechanism to drive this restructuring was "parent-
 student choice of school district." "Choice is the mechanism
 that drives all other changes. ... It provides the incentive to
 change," said one policy entrepreneur (PE 1985). It was antici-
 pated that giving parents and students the options of exiting
 from one district or school and entering another would create
 a market for educational services. "Market forces" would then
 encourage educators to introduce innovative, high quality
 programs to attract and retain students. If a school and its
 teachers were not able to deliver on their educational promises,
 over tine they would lose students and the foundation aid
 that would follow student enrollment. The more effective
 schools and teachers would benefit as students would be
 drawn to their programs and classes. Less effective teachers
 and schools would be compelled to improve or risk loss of
 financial resources, decline in student enrollment, and state
 receivership. "Consumer sovereignty" in education would then
 provide a self-correcting lever to introduce innovations,
 improve performance, and insure accountability, and
 ultimately improve all schools (PE 1984-86).
 Initial efforts of the policy entrepreneurs to "test" these
 ideas began in 1980-81 when they sought and won foundation
 funding to create "design shops" and pilot projects that
 encouraged experimentation with restructuring ideas. Legisla-
 tive initiatives in 1982, although not originally identified with
 the restructuring effort, also were passed (the "Levi Law"). In
 retrospect, this law laid the groundwork on which future legis-
 lative efforts would build, such as the bill sponsored by a
 legislator to introduce choice in the schools for low-income
 families in 1982. Although the bill did not get out of com-
 mittee, it was considered a "door opener" for future efforts.
 In 1982, a major citizens' group in which the policy
 entrepreneurs participated funded a study of the state educa-
 tional system. The findings supported educational restruc-
 turing and recommended that parent-student choice be the
 mechanism of change. Another influential business group
 sponsored its own study-again with policy entrepreneur in-
 volvement-and published similar findings in 1984 supporting
 educational restructuring and choice. These reports added
 weight to the growing interest in education prior to and
 consonant with the publication of A Nation At Risk in 1983.
 Building on these initial efforts, the policy entrepreneurs
 were able to convince the governor in the fall of 1984 to
 champion choice in the schools. His "Access to Excellence"
 program, announced in January 1985, called for educational
 innovation and parent-student choice in selecting and
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 attending any public primary or secondary school in the
 state.
 After bitter debate and intense media coverage, (and
 active policy entrepreneur involvement) the Postsecondary
 Options Enrollnent Act passed in June 1985. All junior and
 senior high school students were given the option of attending
 any state postsecondary school, while receiving both college
 and high-school credit at state expense. An evaluation study
 conducted by the department of education and published in
 February 1987 signaled the program's full implementation and
 legislative acceptance.
 By June 1988, the state passed the nation's first mandatory
 enrollment-options program that extended choice to all kinder-
 garten through twelfth-grade students. The plan was fully
 implemented by the 1990-91 school year. Instrumental in its
 passage was the Governor's Discussion Group, a task force of
 all the major actors involved in the debate over education
 policy. The governor convened the task force in 1985 to
 prepare a "visionary proposal for state education." The con-
 sensus forged by the group prepared the way for the passage
 of the "historic" 1988 legislation. The policy entrepreneurs were
 also active participants in the Governor's Discussion Group.
 ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES
 Policy entrepreneurship, like many other human activities,
 represents a complex, interrelated social process in which
 many activities occur concurrently and in which the conditions
 for action are only partly under the control of the actors being
 studied. This section describes-in light of the case outlined
 above-the basic sets of policy-entrepreneurial activities that
 emerged from the research. The activities presented here
 distill the essence of what these policy entrepreneurs actually
 did in this case. In describing these activities, this section
 attempts to do justice to the complexity and comprehensive-
 ness of the policy entrepreneurs' actions. The following dis-
 cussion of categories of activities-by attempting to capture this
 complexity-does not follow an absolute chronology, nor
 should the activities be interpreted as a sequential set. Many
 activities were concurrent, and others were repeated over time.
 Instead, the activities are presented as logically and
 functionally required sets of actions that are part of the
 formulation and implementation phases of the policy as they
 emerged in this case. The categories are
 * idea generation activities,
 * problem framing activities,
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 * dissemination activities,
 * strategic activities,
 * demonstration project activities,
 * activities cultivating bureaucratic insiders and advocates,
 * collaborative activities with high-profile elite groups,
 * activities enlisting support from elected officials,
 * lobbying activities,
 * activities attracting media attention and support, and
 * administrative and evaluative activities.
 Idea Generation Activities
 The policy entrepreneurs--as writers, authors, analysts,
 researchers, and teachers-traded in ideas, whether the inven-
 tion of wholly new policy ideas or the brokering of others'
 ideas. Drawing on John Maynard Keynes in The General Theory
 of Employment, Interest, and Money, they referred to the power
 of ideas to shape the direction of history:
 The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they
 are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is com-
 monly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. ... I am
 sure the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared
 with the gradual encroachment of ideas. (PE 1985)
 Sources for their ideas were varied, some self-generated
 and most brokered from other policy domains as the policy
 entrepreneurs "scanned the environment" in search of models,
 patterns, data, projects that could be "transposed" into the
 domain of educational policy (PE 1987). The central ideas, as
 outlined above, centered around a redesigned, restructured
 school system driven by the concept of parent-student choice.
 Built on concepts of empowerment of parents and students,
 deregulation, decentralization, and accountability, their ideas
 provided answers to the current educational problems as they,
 the policy entrepreneurs, had defined and framed them.
 Problem-Framing Activities
 Beyond idea generation, the policy entrepreneurs were
 compelled to engage in problem framing and problem defini-
 tion. In order to convince policymakers that their ideas
 represented sound policy, the policy entrepreneurs needed to
 establish a clear link between the identified educational
 problems and their proposed and preferred solutions. There
 were two aspects to this.
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 First, problem definition required identifying a current
 performance gap in education. Citing national, state, and local
 reports and data, the policy entrepreneurs outlined per-
 formance declines of serious proportions. When data were
 sparse or nonexistent, studies were commissioned. Every effort
 was made to foster a heightened sense of alarm regarding the
 current status of state and national education.
 Secondly, the policy entrepreneurs had to convince
 policymakers that their solutions were preferable to others
 generated by more traditional educational groups. To
 accomplish this, they argued that the present educational
 structure had outgrown its capacity to deal with problems of
 the twenty-first century. A system designed for the industrial
 age had been pushed to its limits and needed a complete
 overhaul (PE 1985). Current strategies to "improve education"
 were "well meaning but misguided and costly." "Piecemeal
 tinkering" with the current system was no longer acceptable.
 Nothing less than total system redesign would solve the
 current "crisis" in education. Only a "reconfigured" system with
 a different set of operating assumptions could correct the deep-
 seated problems and address the current and future needs of
 the state (PE 1985).
 This logic had an appeal to lawmakers, especially as the
 policy entrepreneurs argued that the current economic sit-
 uation challenged reformers to find methods to change the
 educational system without adding excessive costs to taxpayers
 and the business community. From the perspective of the
 policy entrepreneurs, those who advocated improvements in
 the current system could offer only two alternatives to
 policymakers--either ante up more money for services
 rendered or suffer a continuing decline in the quality and
 quantity of services delivered. Neither alternative was
 acceptable to the policy entrepreneurs. Their position was that
 much more could be done with the present level of expendi-
 tures by ensuring greater accountability and introducing a new
 lever of change-choice for students and parents, and greater
 control and participation by teachers and local schools. Thus,
 from their view, the problem was shifted from "how education
 can be improved" to "how education should be restructured
 and redesigned to raise quality and accountability" (PE 1985).
 Dissemination Activities
 In order to spread their ideas to as wide an audience as
 possible, the policy entrepreneurs employed a range of dis-
 semination mechanisms. They wrote reports, position papers,
 books, articles, and columns for newspapers and newsletters.
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 They taught courses in universities and in leadership develop-
 ment programs and helped write speeches for elected officials.
 They participated in radio and television discussions and
 debates about educational reform and publicly spoke in a
 variety of forums.
 Interviewees cited telephone calls, personal contacts, "FYI"
 articles and documents sent for their assessment, and "special
 meetings" that brought together educational experts with local
 and state leaders. Said one govermnent official of a policy
 entrepreneur, he is "phenomenal, the most effective organizer
 I've ever run into":
 He just makes a couple of phone calls to people and says: Gee, I'm
 having a little gathering . . . Would you like to come? The governor
 shows up. Everybody shows up. (department of education member
 1985)
 Strategic Activities
 Working and talking together over time, the policy entre-
 preneurs tended to organize themselves into a group for the
 purpose of brainstorming strategies and preparing an opera-
 tional roadmap for change. A growing list of activities and an
 increasing number of supporters and interested parties made it
 imperative to keep the attention focused and keep the momen-
 tum going. Therefore, while not formalizing their strategies
 into any written document, nor following any "rational stra-
 tegic planning process" (PE 1987), they began to develop 'long-
 term strategies" to guide their overall efforts and "short-term
 tactics" to cope with the changing political realities on a day-
 to-day basis.
 "Long-term strategy" provided the overall direction of
 change. "Short-term tactics" often centered on the legislature
 and the shifting political context. Tactical strategy had to be
 modified to fit the evolving political context in terms of what
 was attainable given the shifting political mood. As one policy
 entrepreneur commented,
 What we're doing ... is both identifying short-term tactics and long-
 term strategies ... or how we make this happen. Nothing like this
 happens that isn't orchestrated. This doesn't fall into place. You've got
 to decide where to push, when you push, and what your position iS.4
 Demonstration Projects and Activities
 Lacking data to prove their ideas were solutions to the
 problems that beset education (at least early in the innovation
 process), two policy entrepreneurs-working with other
 'Several themes or assumptions about
 the change process governed strategy
 deliberations. One veteran strategist
 provided "rules of thumb," which are
 listed in Appendix A.
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 change-oriented individuals-formed a group entitled Public
 School Incentives (PSI). The group's purpose was "to translate
 innovative, high potential ideas into demonstration projects in
 order to test their efficacy and potential success" in the state
 school system (PSI member 1985). Results of the projects, if
 successful, would attract additional supporters and could then
 be used to argue for a more permanent status for the innova-
 tions.
 Funding became critical to support these demonstration
 projects. PSI was eventually able to attract $1.2 million from
 foundations willing to support the innovative ideas, much of it
 devoted to the testing and analysis of the policy entrepreneurs'
 ideas on school-based management and parent-student choice.
 Activities to Cultivate Bureaucratic Insiders and Advocates
 Located as they were outside the formal governmental
 system, the policy entrepreneurs were aware that the major
 changes they proposed would be difficult to achieve without
 the support of advocates within the bureaucratic system.
 Strategically placed insiders within the bureaucracy would be
 important allies not only in the legislative phase of the
 innovation process, but also in the critical implementation
 phase. Two examples were particularly noteworthy in illus-
 trating how the policy entrepreneurs developed a govern-
 mental network of like-minded reformists.
 In the first case, the policy entrepreneurs needed a
 change oriented policy administrator to support a reform
 agenda. They were credited with "working behind the scenes"
 with the governor's staff and key legislators to facilitate the
 appointment of the commissioner of education, a self-
 proclaimed change agent (executive agency official 1985). The
 commissioner's stance toward educational reform and her
 support of many of their ideas would, they anticipated, help
 disseninate reform ideas within the department and the state's
 school districts (PE 1987; 1988).
 In fact, according to several policy entrepreneurs and
 informed others, without the commissioner "no significant
 change would have occurred" (informed other 1988). She
 allowed the policy entrepreneurs to help shape the agenda of
 the Governor's Discussion Group; she invited them to serve on
 the task force evaluating the Postsecondary Options Act, and
 she accepted their help, from secretarial services to stuffing
 envelopes, in the evaluation process (executive agency staff
 1987). And it was she who was credited with a well-managed
 and well-executed implementation phase for each piece of
 reform legislation (executive agency staff 1988).
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 In the second case, the policy entrepreneurs cultivated a
 relationship with a member of the departnent of education.
 He reported his ties dated back to 1980 when he participated
 in a university sponsored leadership development program in
 which a policy entrepreneur participated. The policy entre-
 preneurs kept in touch with him throughout his tenure in
 government through telephone calls, meetings, and discussion
 groups, often sending him articles and papers to keep him
 abreast of their latest thinking. He, in turn, was a source of
 inside information on the department's activities. He played a
 critical role in getting access to the governor for the policy
 entrepreneurs, supporting the reform ideas during the legis-
 lative debates, staffing the Governor's Discussion Group, and
 helping to find administrative solutions to the problems posed
 by the innovative ideas. In sum, his participation and contri-
 butions to the reform drama were described as "crucial" by the
 policy entrepreneurs.
 Collaborative Activities With High Profile, Elite Groups
 Elites, or "thought leaders" as one policy entrepreneur
 called them, were important to cultivate for the innovation
 process. ". . . if you got the elites committed, the rest would
 fall into place" (PE 1986).
 Elite, high profile participation was important for several
 reasons. First, it provided a funding base to support entre-
 preneurial activities that needed testing in the educational
 marketplace. Pilots and demonstration activities sponsored by
 the policy entrepreneurs were thus able to receive funding
 from major foundations interested in supporting educational
 innovation. Secondly, high-profile groups had the resources to
 fund studies, independent of government, that would provide
 an "objective assessment" of the state educational system. One
 well-respected business association paid for a study and made
 a significant contribution to the identification of a "per-
 formance gap" in state education. This study, with policy-
 entrepreneur input, also recommended solutions compatible
 with the policy entrepreneurs' ideas. And finally, because of
 their credibility and visibility, these high profile groups were
 effective during legislative debates when they marshalled their
 resources and supporters (with policy-entrepreneur assistance)
 to form lobby groups, testify during hearings, engage in letter-
 writing campaigns, and make extensive personal appeals in
 support of the innovative ideas.
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 Activities to Enlist Support from Elected Officials
 Cultivating a like-minded network within the govern-
 mental bureaucracy and among elite, high profile groups
 outside of government was vital, but it had to be comple-
 mented with support drawn from elected officials. Legislators
 and the governor were the vehicles through which educational
 reforms were institutionalized into law.
 Initial legislative activities on the choice concept began in
 1983-84 when a state representative introduced a bill recom-
 mending a voucher option for students of low- and moderate-
 income families. The bill gave the topic of vouchers visibility
 and focused discussion on an issue that previously did not
 have enough legitimacy to warrant a hearing. According to one
 analyst, it was a "door opener" (Wilhelm 1984). Although testi-
 mony was taken in the hearing, neither proponents nor oppo-
 nents of the bill called for a vote. 'Nobody ever expected the
 bill to pass but everyone expected it to stir up a thoroughly
 interesting conversation about how you were going to change
 things" (Wilhelm 1984, 257).
 In the subsequent years, it became apparent that oppo-
 sition from key educational groups provided a major impedi-
 ment to the passage of choice legislation. One policy
 entrepreneur summed it up by saying:
 It was very clear ... with the strength education groups-the
 organized groups-enjoyed in this state, we weren't going to get
 anywhere without a major, popular political leader making it his
 policy. It was absolutely of basic importance to find out if the
 Governor would undertake this cause. (Mazzoni 1986, 33)
 The opportunity came along in the fall of 1984. Respond-
 ing to a comment from one of the governor's key policy
 advisors, who had mentioned that the governor's executive
 team was "in the market for an educational program," one
 policy entrepreneur gathered together a group of other policy
 entrepreneurs to prepare a proposal. A meeting was scheduled
 for the next day with the governor's team. This two-to-three
 hour session, said one insider, "altered [the state's] education
 agenda":
 They [policy entrepreneurs] had a meeting with the executive
 team. And [policy entrepreneur] sold them on choice. I mean to
 the point where [member of the finance department] loved it so
 much that he couldn't stop talking about it. (executive agency
 staff 1985)
 The governor surprised his advisors in his response to the
 new educational proposal presented in follow-on briefings.
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 According to a staff member, the governor was "very enthu-
 siastic" about the ideas and gave his go-ahead to draft a formal
 proposal for the legislature. His formal initiative, almost
 identical to ideas espoused by the policy entrepreneurs, was
 unveiled on January 4, 1985. From then until the conference
 committee report approved parts of his bill during a special
 session in June, the govemnor labored with energy and enthu-
 siasm. 'I haven't worked for anything this hard," he was
 reported as saying (Mazzoni 1986, 91).
 While the governor represented a powerful ally in state
 government, it was essential-given the reality of legislative
 politics-to find key legislators to carry his bill through the
 enactment process. After some negotiating with the governor,
 his team and the policy entrepreneurs, the House majority
 leader (not of the governor's party) agreed to be the chief
 House sponsor of the governor's bill. (She had sponsored
 earlier legislation to permit choice to junior and senior high-
 school students to enroll in postsecondary courses). In the
 Senate, the principal author was the chair of the Subcommittee
 on Education Aids and a member of the governor's party.
 These two legislators joined with the govemor to champion
 choice in the schools.
 This first round was followed by three more years of
 legislative maneuvering, with additional champions from the
 legislature joining forces with the governor to work for educa-
 tional reform. By June 1988, the first choice legislation in the
 nation passed into law, providing choice to all kindergarten
 through twelfth-grade students in state public schools by
 1990-91.
 Lobbying Activities
 After the governor formally initiated his legislative
 program, entrepreneurial efforts to persuade and sell the ideas
 of parent-student choice and educational restructuring intensi-
 fied and expanded their scope. Lobbying activities began in
 earnest, focusing on the legislature and the general public.
 'Visible types"-the high profile people and groups-were
 enlisted to capture media attention and provide political clout.
 Lobby groups, including one sponsored by the same business
 association that funded major educational study, formed and
 employed a lobbyist and a public relations specialist (also a
 policy entrepreneur) to lobby for the governor's bill. The
 business association also put together a letter writing campaign
 and sponsored personal appearances of key business execu-
 tives to provide public support during the legislative debate.
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 Another policy entrepreneur pulled together a group of
 educators and the governor and some of his advisors to form
 what was expected to be the nucleus of a growing statewide
 network to support choice. The goal was to begin a massive
 campaign to blanket newspaper editorial columns with favor-
 able letters to influence legislators. By March 1986, this
 grassroots organization, 780 members strong, was ready to go
 up against some of the state's most effective lobbying groups,
 the teacher unions.
 Orchestrated by the "tireless" leadership of two policy
 entrepreneurs, said to be at the legislature "night and day," this
 grassroots organization was successful in shaping testimony
 with the skillful selection of credible parents and educators.
 They disseminated research information to legislators and their
 staffs, and created a visible presence in the hearings. One
 legislative analyst noted their impact:
 This has been one of the few issues in all the years I've been here that
 I've seen develop that way.... This developed almost in textbook
 fashion. The testimony was convincing! People came in support of
 that idea that you never would have expected ... (Mazzoni 1986, 67)
 Activities to Attract Media Attention and Support
 Media attention and editorial support were critical for the
 policy entrepreneurs. Several explained that it was difficult to
 overcome the tremendous opposition of the traditional educa-
 tional groups, especially the teacher unions. Considered to be
 some of the most powerful lobbies in the state, the unions had
 public support and massive resources that they could and did
 summon against choice. Their opposition made it vital for the
 policy entrepreneurs to attract media attention and take the
 issue of choice public, attempting to gain greater visibility and
 credibility for their cause.
 The policy entrepreneurs were successful in convincing
 the media, especially in the capital and major cities, that "this
 issue [choice] is worth doing" (PE 1988). They worked "very
 hard" to get and keep press coverage. Said one, "we called ...
 we begged" to get the press involved and keep the issues on
 the agenda (PE 1988).
 Several policy entrepreneurs had strong connections with
 the major papers and television and radio stations to facilitate
 this process. Editorial writers reported their ties and associ-
 ations with two policy entrepreneurs in particular (media 1986;
 1987). One called a policy entrepreneur a "close friend" and
 another credited him with providing perspective and 'helpful"
 information for his editorials.
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 Their access and influence with the media was not lost on
 the opposition. One interest-group nember from the "educa-
 tional establishment," who opposed choice legislation, criti-
 cized a major paper for its "lack of objectivity" in reporting on
 the issues. He described one entrepreneur's media interven-
 tions in the following way:
 He [the policy entrepreneur] has excellent access to the media.... In
 fact the [paper] has lost its perspective in news coverage.... They
 like to focus on change and controversy. (interest group member 1987)
 Administrative and Evaluative Activities
 June 1985 marked the first of several acts signed into law
 that were supportive of choice and educational restructuring.
 With the passage of this and subsequent legislation, the formal
 implementation and evaluation processes began. While these
 efforts were spearheaded by the commissioner and the state
 department of education, the policy entrepreneurs were closely
 involved. Four policy entrepreneurs participated in a
 evaluation study mandated by the legislature. In addition,
 policy entrepreneurs provided secretarial assistance to the
 department when mass mailings were done. They also coordi-
 nated pro-testimony in the legislative hearings, which by all
 accounts provided the compelling evidence that the program
 was worth continuing. Ultimately, their actions were credited
 as essential in preventing the program from being gutted
 (department of education member 1987).1
 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
 This previous section categorized the depth and scope of
 the policy entrepreneurs' activities. Upon closer examination,
 the sets of activities can be grouped into logical categories or
 theoretical constructs that capture in a more general way the
 range of entrepreneurial actions (Glaser 1978, 55-82). The four
 categories and the activities subsumed in each are outlined in
 Exhibit 2.
 Creative/intellectual defines the capability of the policy
 entrepreneurs to generate new ideas or to translate, apply and
 disseminate (broker) ideas from other policy domains into a
 new context. Strategic specifies the extent to which the policy
 entrepreneurs formulated strategies for action, both long-term
 and short-term, including heuristics for action. Mobilization/
 execution marks the ability of policy entrepreneurs to take an
 innovative idea and move it through the legislative or adminis-
 trative agenda into action, which, in this case, culminated in
 legislative mandates. Administrative/evaluative indicates the
 level of the policy entrepreneurs' participation in the
 'With the evaluation of the choice
 legislation, the policy entrepreneurs
 completed their last hurdle in the
 policy-innovation process at the state
 level. It should be noted that the
 same activities in which they engaged
 at the state and local levels were
 being duplicated at the national level.
 Building on their earlier efforts, they
 continued to spread their ideas to a
 national audience; they appealed to
 leaders who could champion the
 "cause"; they built support among
 "visible types" who could mobilize
 interest; they developed an expanded
 network of supporters to lobby for
 their ideas; and they eagerly sought
 press coverage and endorsement. The
 same pattern of activities began to
 repeat itself at the national level.
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 Exhibit 2
 Activity Structure of Policy Entrepreneurship
 Creative/Intellectual Activities
 1. Generate Ideas
 * Invent new policy ideas
 * Apply models and ideas from other policy domains
 2. Define Problem and Select Solution
 * Define performance gap
 * Identify preferred solution alternative
 3. Disseminate Ideas
 Strategic Category Activities
 1. Formulate grand strategy and vision
 2. Evolve political strategy
 3. Develop heuristics for action
 Mobilization and Execution Activities
 1. Establish demonstration projects
 2. Cultivate bureaucratic insiders and advocates
 3. Collaborate with high profile individuals/elite groups
 4. Enlist elected officials
 5. Form lobby groups and coordinate efforts
 6. Cultivate media attention and support
 Administrative and Evaluative Activities
 1. Facilitate program administration
 2. Participate in program evaluation
 implementation process when legislative (or administrative)
 mandates were organizationally tested and evaluated for their
 ultimate contribution and effectiveness.
 The four categories of entrepreneurial activities and the
 associated actions were comprehensive and collective in nature.6
 By virtue of their positions outside the formal governmental
 system and of being unable to rely on any regular funding
 source or any permanent organization base, the policy
 entrepreneurs had to be involved in a wide-ranging set of
 activities to empower themselves and their ideas. They could
 not rely on position power in government to press for funding
 of pilots. They had to search out funding sources and create
 their own demonstration projects. They could not be guaran-
 teed a place during official meetings where key policy dis-
 cussions took place. Instead they had to cultivate
 'There is a rich and developed litera-
 ture that marks the importance of
 many of the activities described
 herein: the importance of ideas (Cobb
 and Elder 1983; Light 1982; Schon
 1971; Walker 1981); the framing of
 problems (Cobb and Elder 1983;
 Wilson 1981); the mobilization of
 public opinion and public advocacy
 (Cobb and Elder 1983); the over-
 coming of system bias (Cobb and
 Elder 1983); the issue-translation
 process (Eyestone 1978); and alter-
 native specification (Kingdon 1984).
 Many of the entrepreneurial activities
 described are also common political
 behaviors found in the literature:
 the development of a funding base to
 support actions, the cultivation of
 elites, the creation of networks and
 strategically placed insiders, and
 the mobilization of grassroots
 support (Allison 1971; Bardach 1977;
 Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). What
 has not been documented is the com-
 prehensiveness of these activities in
 terms of policy entrepreneurship.
 This literature also tends to focus
 on political action, while we have
 found that creative, intellectual
 activities as well as administrative
 and evaluative activities are a critical
 part of the policy entrepreneurs'
 repertoire of behavior.
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 bureaucratic insiders in order to keep themselves informed.
 Without automatically being included in the work related
 networks among governmental officials, they had to forge their
 own contacts both in and out of government. Unable to
 guarantee media coverage for their ideas simply by virtue of
 holding an office, they had to be resourceful in attracting and
 holding media attention.
 One also can reason that without position power in the
 formal governmental system, the policy entrepreneurs had to
 collectively work with and through others. While idea genera-
 tion and problem definition can be carried out by a relatively
 small group of people,7 it was beyond the policy entrepre-
 neurs' purview to sponsor legislation, bargain their way
 through hearings and closed-door sessions, and ultimately
 pass, administer, and evaluate the laws. Under these circum-
 stances, their influence could only be felt in working
 collectively with those who had the legal authority and
 responsibility to carry out such work, such as the policy
 champions (the governor and legislators), and the policy
 administrators (the commissioner of education and administra-
 tors in the schools).
 There are several alternative explanations to account for
 the comprehensive and collective behavior of the policy entre-
 preneurs. On the one hand, one could argue that these policy
 entrepreneurs provide an excellent example of what successful
 policy entrepreneurs do.8 In order for any policy entrepreneurs
 to operate effectively, it would seem that they must be willing
 to engage in a comparable set of activities. These activities
 suggest a list of the necessary, although not sufficient, ele-
 ments for successful policy entrepreneurship. Assuming this to
 be the case, one would expect to find a comparable set of
 activities for all policy entrepreneurs who are successful at
 introducing and implementing innovations, even those entre-
 preneurs operating in other policy domains and at other levels
 of government.
 Another interpretation draws on the results from
 innovation-diffusion research to explain the comprehensive
 and collective character of entrepreneurial behavior. In general,
 as Rogers and Kim explain, innovations will be adopted more
 rapidly than others to the extent that they are perceived by
 receivers to have (1985, 88):
 1. Greater relative advantage. "Relative advantage is the
 degree to which an innovation is perceived as better than
 the practice than it supersedes."
 'See King (1988) and King and Roberts
 (forthcoming) for a more-developed
 description of how the policy entre-
 preneurs functioned as a group.
 'We define "success" in public entre-
 preneurship in terms of the imple-
 mentation of the innovative idea. If an
 idea has survived the creative, design,
 and implementation stages-the func-
 tional requisites of the innovation
 process-then we consider it to be
 successful. We do not assume that an
 implemented idea is a "good." We
 agree with Schumpeter (1942) that
 innovation has destructive as well as
 constructive consequences. Depending
 on one's perspective, innovation can
 be evaluated as "good" or it can be
 judged as "bad." As such, we believe
 it is important to separate assess-
 ments about the innovation's good-
 ness or badness from its capacity to
 survive. Survival, in this situation,
 does not imply approbation of the
 ideas nor the means to achieve them.
 Avoidance of this "positive bias"
 (Kimberly 1981) enables us to com-
 pare and contrast successful and un-
 successful entrepreneurs. Successful
 entrepreneurs differ from failed ones
 in their ability to move an innovation
 through creation, design, and imple-
 mentation. We are also at liberty to
 make judgments about the policy
 entrepreneurs' ethics and account-
 ability during this process. While
 Oliver North and his associates can be
 considered to be successful in their
 creation, design, and implementation
 of new procedures to fund the
 Contras, the ethics and legality of
 their means and ends are still open
 for discussion.
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 2. Greater compatibility. "Compatibility is the degree to
 which an innovation is perceived to be consistent with the
 existing values, past experiences, and needs of the
 potential adopters."
 3. Greater trialability. 'Trialability is the degree to which an
 innovation may be tested on a limited basis."
 4. Greater observability. "Observability is the degree to
 which the results of an innovation are visible to others."
 5. Less Complexity. "Complexity is the degree to which an
 innovation is viewed as difficult to understand and use."
 Although these are not the only qualities that affect
 adoption, research indicates they are the most important char-
 acteristics of innovations in explaining adoption rates (Rogers
 and Kim 1985, 89). It could be argued, therefore, that the
 radical innovation espoused by the policy entrepreneurs was
 perceived by those in the policy system to be less relatively
 advantaged, compatible, "trialable," and observable, and more
 complex than the practice it was intended to supersede. If
 these were the perceptions, one could have expected greater
 resistance to the introduction and implementation of such a
 radical idea. To counter this resistance, the policy entre-
 preneurs would have been compelled to engage in a compre-
 hensive set of actions to ensure the continued viability of the
 innovation. Thus, the greater the resistance to an innovative
 idea, the more comprehensive that policy entrepreneurs' activi-
 ties need to be to overcome it. This hypothesized relationship
 can be summarized as: The more radical the innovation, the
 higher the expected resistance to the innovation, and therefore,
 the more comprehensive the activity structure of policy entre-
 preneurs needs to be to ensure viability of the innovation.
 Given the study's research design, we were unable to
 ascertain which of the two interpretations is a more likely
 explanation of the policy entrepreneurs' behavior in this
 particular case. We have documented what the policy entre-
 preneurs did and how they did it. Whether one, both or
 neither of these interpretations offers an accurate assessment of
 why the policy entrepreneurs acted as they did remains for
 future research to determine.
 CONCLUSION
 This longitudinal examination of policy entrepreneurship
 identified a basic activity structure that adequately encom-
 passes the work of six policy entrepreneurs as they engaged in
 public policy innovation. The findings of this study are
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 important insofar as they illustrate what may well be generic
 activities associated with successful policy innovation and
 entrepreneurship. Using the methodology of naturalistic
 inquiry to avoid the problems associated with retrospective
 case histories, we documented in detail how policy entre-
 preneurs operated on a day-to-day basis to develop, translate,
 and implement innovative ideas into public sector practice.
 From Gormley's perspective (1987), however, this research
 is limited by analysis of a single innovation in a single setting.
 Given the in-depth, longitudinal nature of this naturalistic
 inquiry, with its multimethod research design, we were unable
 to expand our research to include other sites and other innova-
 tions. This limitation opens up the research to the criticism that
 these policy entrepreneurs were unique individuals operating
 in a very special context. As such, the study's findings would
 not be expected to be generalizable to other policy domains or
 other state, national, or local settings.
 One must remember, however, that naturalistic inquiry,
 "like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions
 and not to populations or universes" (Yin 1987, 21). Compar-
 able to laboratory research, this study does not represent a
 "sample." The goal has been to develop a theory rather than to
 enumerate frequencies (i.e., statistical generalization). To
 establish the validity of this emerging theory of policy entre-
 preneurship, one would need to design a series of studies to
 compare and contrast other policy entrepreneurs' activity
 structures in other policy domains at different governmental
 levels. Consistency among findings would point to a funda-
 mental activity structure characteristic of all policy entre-
 preneurs. As noted earlier, we would recommend control for
 the radicalness of the innovative idea to determine if the
 comprehensive nature of the activity structure is associated
 with the level of resistance to an innovation rather than
 associated with its success.
 Follow-on research also should include comparisons
 between successful policy entrepreneurs and unsuccessful ones
 (those whose ideas do not survive the design and implementa-
 tion phase of the innovation process). Are the activities
 between the two groups different and, if so, how do they
 differ? A common activity structure for policy entrepreneurs
 moves the field closer to a theory of policy entrepreneurship
 that would enable specification of the necessary elements of
 successful policy innovation.
 Future research on policy entrepreneurship also should
 focus attention on others involved in the innovation process.
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 The phenomenon we observed involved multiple actors in a
 complex policy environment to affect change. The resulting
 emerging theory of policy entrepreneurship suggests that
 entrepreneurs can increase the probability of success by
 developing an activity structure similar to the entrepreneurs in
 this study. However, this theory also recognizes that this
 activity structure alone does not contain the necessary and
 sufficient elements for change. A perception of "crisis," a
 growing recognition that a policy alternative has merit, the
 existence of skillful policy champions and policy adminis-
 trators to support the idea, these and other factors played a
 part in producing the innovation. There are limitations to what
 policy entrepreneurs can do on their own.
 The policy entrepreneurs in this study acknowledged their
 limits. They believed that the innovation process "could not be
 managed" because the results or outcomes were beyond the
 direct control of any single player or group of players (PE
 1986). While influencing the flow of events, they did not control
 them. There were other important factors and players in the
 drama. This complexity suggests that future studies include
 the complete network of policy actors involved in the innova-
 tion process. These efforts would be expected to yield an even
 richer understanding of the policy innovation process and the
 central part that policy entrepreneurs play in it.
 APPENDIX A
 Rules of Thumb for Strategy Deliberations
 1. Know where you want to end up and don't lose sight of
 where you are headed.
 2. Don't play the 'Washington game" by trading away the
 fundamental elements of the plan. Compromise yields bad
 policy. Say "no"' rather than give up what you really want.
 3. Wait for the "background conditions" (political context) to
 change, thus necessitating the kind of change you want.
 4. Mature bureaucracies, like education, never initiate
 meaningful change from within, therefore outside pressure
 is needed to force them to respond.
 5. Change never comes through consensus. Get the key lead-
 ership to back your idea and the "pack will rush to
 follow."
 6. Money is needed to make change.... Get the elites
 involved.
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 7. Keep on issues where you have the advantage.
 8. Keep the educational establishment talking about change
 and structural issues and you're liable to change some
 minds.
 9. Destabilize the opposition by coopting one of the
 educational establishment groups. (Teachers were chosen
 because they have the most to gain from the changes being
 recommended. Also the national leadership of a state
 organization was receptive.)
 10. Be willing to be bold.
 (Paraphrased, PE 1986)
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